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ABSTRACT 
Philosophers	 weren`t	 thinking	 a	 lot	 about	 terrorism	 before	 the	 terrorist	 attacks	 in	 the	 United	 States	 on	 11	
September	2001,	or	even	when	they	were	thinking	the	main	concern	was	how	to	deal	with	terrorism.	But	after	this	
terrorist	attack	terrorism	was	high	on	the	philosophical	agenda	mainly	manifested	as	an	ethical	problem.	The	key	
concern	was:	can	terrorism	be	morally	justified?	That	is	the	issue	we	are	dealing	in	this	paper	too.	
But,	the	answer	of	this	question	largely	depends	on	the	treatment	of	terrorism,	i.e.	from	the	answer	on	a	previous	
question:	what	 is	 terrorism?	With	 regard	 to	 the	 problem	of	 defining	 terrorism	 the	 dominant	 approach	 seeks	 to	
acknowledge	 the	 core	meaning	 “terrorism”	has	 in	 common	use.	 That	 is	why	we	 are	 going	 to	 give	 some	 various	
definitions	of	terrorism	from	which	the	ethical	problem	of	terrorism	arises.	Aftermaths	we	will	make	an	overview	of	
the	most	important	theories	and	philosophers	that	are	dealing	with	this	question.	We	will	consider	the	two	main	
approaches	 to	 this	 issue.	 Namely,	 in	 ethics	 there	 are	 two	 main	 approaches:	 consequentialist	 and	
nonconsequentialists.	 First	 ones	 are	 judging	 ethical	 issues	 based	 on	 the	 consequences	 second	 ones	 the	 moral	
status	 of	 the	 ideas	 nevertheless	 of	 their	 consequences.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 terrorism	 that	 would	 mean	 that	
consequentialists	 propose	 to	 judge	 terrorism,	 like	 everything	 else,	 in	 light	 of	 its	 consequences.	
Nonconsequentialists	 argue	 that	 its	 moral	 status	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 matter	 of	 what	 consequences,	 on	 balance,	
terrorism	has,	but	is	rather	determined,	whether	solely	or	largely,	by	what	it	is.	For	the	consequentialists,	the	test	
of	terrorism	is	what is done,	for	the	nonconsequentialists	what	the	ultimate aim	of	doing	it	is.	And	this	distinction	is	
not	merely	just	formal.	In	this	paper	we	will	clarify	those	distinctions.	
Key words: terrorism, ethics, war on terror, good, bad, consequentialist, nonconsequentialists, terrorists, West. 
	
INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers	 weren`t	 thinking	 a	 lot	 about	 terrorism	 before	 the	 terrorist	 attacks	 in	 the	 United	 States	 on	 11	
September	2001,	or	even	when	they	were	thinking	their	main	concern	was	how	to	deal	with	terrorism	not	how	to	
think	 terrorism.	 But	 after	 this	 attack	 terrorism	 was	 high	 on	 the	 philosophical	 agenda	 mainly	 manifested	 as	 an	
ethical	problem.	The	key	concern	was:	what	is	terrorism	in	its	essence	and	thus	can	terrorism	be	morally	justified?	
These	are	the	issue	that	we	are	going	to	examine	in	this	paper	too.	
But	 the	 answer	 of	 this	 crucial	 question	 of	 moral	 justification	 of	 terrorism	 largely	 depends	 on	 the	 treatment	 of	
terrorism,	i.e.	depends	on	the	answer	of	the	first	very	important	issue:	what	is	terrorism?	The	history	of	terrorism	is	
probably	coextensive	with	 the	history	of	political	violence.	The	 term	“terrorism”,	however,	 is	 relatively	 recent:	 it	
has	been	in	use	since	late	18th	century.	When	it	first	entered	public	discourse	in	the	West,	the	word	“terrorism”	
meant	the	reign	of	terror	the	Jacobins	imposed	in	France	from	the	fall	of	1793	to	the	summer	of	1794.	Since	than	
the	term	terrorism	was	charged	with	so	many	meanings	that	we	can`t	even	trace	all	the	historical	changes.	And	of	
course	that	is	not	in	the	scope	of	this	paper	after	all.	So	we	are	not	going	to	deal	with	the	historical	insight	in	to	this	
problem.	What	we	are	going	to	deal	is	the	ethical	dimension	of	the	problem.	But	prior	to	that	we	will	hаve	to	try	to	
define	the	term.		
With	regard	to	the	problem	of	defining	terrorism	the	dominant	approach	seeks	to	acknowledge	the	core	meaning	
“terrorism”	has	in	common	use.	That	is	why	it	is	of	significant	importance	to	define	properly	terrorism.	But	is	that	
possible	at	all?	One	can`t	find	“official”	and	universally	accepted	definition	of	terrorism	in	any	official	document	of	
any	 relevant	 international	 organizations	 that	 is	 officially	 recognized	 by	 all	 state	members.	 Even	 as	 a	 legal	 term,	
terrorism	 is	 quite	 blurry.	 Renewed	 international	 lawyer	 Rosalyn	 Higgins	 in	 the	 coauthored	 book	 Terrorism and 
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International Law	 concludes:	 “Terrorism	 is	 a	 term	without	 legal	 significance.	 It	 is	 a	merely	 a	 convenient	way	 of	
alluding	to	activities	whether	of	States	or	individuals	widely	disapproved	of	and	in	which	either	the	methods	used	
are	unlawful	or	the	targets	protected	or	both.”1		
When	 philosophers	 are	 dealing	 with	 this	 issue	 they	 are	 interested	 in	 two	 aspects	 of	 terrorism,	 i.e.	 philosophy	
focuses	 on	 two	 fundamental	 questions.	 The	 first	 is	 conceptual:	 What	 is	 terrorism?	 The	 second	 is	 moral:	 Can	
terrorism	ever	be	morally	justified?	These	are	related	questions	and	actually	the	answer	of	the	second	one	depends	
of	the	first	one.	That	 is	why	we	are	going	to	make	an	overview	of	this	effort	to	define	terrorism,	but	firstly	 from	
merely	 political	 angle.	We	 are	 going	 to	 track	 some	definitions	 offered	by	 international	 organizations	 and	 states.	
Before	we	see	what	philosophers	have	to	say	let`s	hear	what	politics	has	to	say.	
	
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Terrorism,	which	 is	 a	 concept	 that	maintains	 its	presence	 in	each	period	of	 international	 relations,	 also	 takes	 its	
place	among	the	new	threats	defined	against	the	security	of	nation	state	in	this	era.	In	its	simplest	form	terrorism	
can	be	defined	 as	 “politically motivated violence”	 both	 the	history	of	 conceptualization	of	 terrorism	 is	 based	on	
quite	old,	directly	affected	by	changes	in	the	world	conjuncture	and	defined	in	different	ways	in	different	periods	of	
time.	 In	 this	 complexity	 of	 concept	 the	 definition	 of	 terror	 and	 terrorism	 can	 be	 done	 through	 using	 the	 both	
fundamental	 distinguishing	 features	 and	 reasons	 or	 consequences	 of	 terrorism	 that	 differentiate	 other	 forms	 of	
violence.	There	is	certain	number	of	distinctive	defining	features	of	terrorism	that	differentiate	it	from	other	kind	of	
violence.	For	 terrorism,	an	organisation	 that	 is	politically	organized	 is	necessary.	 In	addition	 there	have	 to	be	an	
existence	of	a	systematic	and	continuous	use	of	violence.	In	this	context	a	kind	of	violence	called	“ordinary	crime”	
can	be	defined	as	terror	because	it	creates	fear	in	society	however	it	is	not	terrorism	because	there	is	no	political	
stimulates.	Figure	1	shows	the	process	of	terrorism	with	its	distinctive	elements.	According	to	figure,	the	motive	is	
the	 reason	 that	 existed	before	and	motivate	 the	 criminals.	 The	motivation	of	 criminal	of	 terrorism	 is	political.	A	
terrorist	who	moves	with	political	motivation	uses	violence	as	a	tool.	In	other	words,	the	violence	is	a	tool	because	
there	is	no	terror	and	terrorism	without	violence.		Because	of	the	purpose	of	terrorism	is	to	create	fear	or	erase	the	
idea	that	the	state	protects	its	citizens,	it	should	contain	violence	or	threat	of	violence	to	crate	an	absolute	fear	in	
individual	minds.	The	benefit	that	desired	to	be	obtained	from	these	acts	of	violence	can	be	defined	as	the	intents	
of	terrorism.2	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
	
Figure	1:	Distinctive	elements	of	Terrorism	
	
In	addition,	we	are	going	to	see	how	international	institutions	and	states	tried	to	define	terrorism.	As	we	can	see	
there	 is	 no	 internationally	 recognized	 definition.	 So	 far	 United Nations	 haven’t	 come	 out	 with	 definition	 of	
terrorism	that	 is	 internationally	recognized.	 It	 is	not	that	the	UN	or	 its	earlier	 incarnation,	the	League	of	Nations,	
was	not	concerned	about	terrorism.	Following	the	1934	assassination	of	King	Alexander	I	of	Yugoslavia	in	Marseilles	
by	 Croatian	 and	 Macedonian	 separatists,	 France	 proposed	 that	 the	 League	 should	 adopt	 a	 comprehensive	
convention	on	 terrorism.	 This	was	 done	on	November	 16,	 1937.	However,	 it	 restricted	 “terrorism”	only	 to	 anti-
State	acts	by	defining	 it	as	“criminal	acts	directed	against	a	State	and	 intended	or	calculated	to	create	a	state	of	
																																																						
1	R.	Higgins	and	M.	Flory,	(ed.)	International Law and Terrorism,	Routledge	London,	1997,	13  
2	 Sertaç	Başeren,	“Terörizm:	Kavramsal	Bir	Değerlendirme”,		Ü.ÖZDAĞ	ve	O.M.	ÖZTÜRK	(Der.),	Terörizm İncelemeleri,	Ankara,	
ASAM	Yayınları,	2000,	1-15,	pp.	2-3	
MOTIVE: Political TOOL: VIOLANCE PURPOSE:  To Achieve a result of fear. 
INTENT: The “benefit” that 
want from the crime 
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terror	in	the	minds	of	particular	persons	or	a	group	of	persons	or	the	general	public.”	The	League	asked	member	
states	 to	pass	 national	 laws.	However	 it	 never	 came	 into	 effect	 owing	 to	disputes	over	 extradition.	Also,	 armed	
freedom	struggles	to	overthrow	established	regimes	were	on	the	rise,	some	sponsored	by	other	powerful	states.		
So	far	the	UN	drew	14	legal	 instruments	(12	conventions	and	2	protocols),	describing	what	constituted	individual	
acts	 of	 terrorism3.	 The	 first	 was	 the	 1963	 Tokyo convention	 on	 “in	 flight	 safety”	 (“Convention	 on	 Offences	 and	
Certain	 other	 acts	 Committed	 on	 board	 aircraft”).	 Next	 was	 the	 convention	 against	 hijacking	 in	 1970.	 The	 first	
hijacking	was	 of	 an	EL-Al	 plane	 in	 1968	 from	Rome	by	 PLO	 (PFLP	 of	George	Habbash).	 This	 is	 called	The Hague 
convention.	 In	2010,	an	additional	protocol	–	so	called	-	Beijing protocol	 -	was	added	to	this	convention.	 In	1971,	
another	 convention	 was	 passed	 to	 reinforce	 air	 travel	 security	 on	 the	 recommendation	 of	 the	Montreal	 based	
International	Civil	Aviation	Organization.	 In	the	same	year,	diplomats	were	protected	under	a	special	convention.	
This	was	necessitated	by	a	spate	of	attacks	on	 the	diplomatic	missions	of	USA,	UK,	 Israel	and	Cuba	during	1971-
1972.	In	1979,	hostage	taking	was	prohibited.	Eight	more	legal	instruments	were	drawn	up	between	1980	and	2005	
for	the	safety	of	nuclear	material,	prevention	of	airport	violence,	safety	of	maritime	navigation	and	fixed	platforms	
(oil	drills),	prevention	of	plastic	explosives,	terrorist	bombings	and	terrorist	financing.	
Since	 2000,	 the	 UN Ad Hoc Committee	 has	 been	 examining	 a	 draft	 paper	 on	 “Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism”4	–	including	a	common	definition.	Even	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	9/11	the	UN	failed	
to	adopt	the	convention,	and	the	deadlock	continues	to	this	day.	As	far	as	we	know	the	latest	effort	was	made	by	
General	Assembly	Working	Group	 -	 established	 to	 finalize	 a	draft	 convention	on	 international	 terrorism5.	But	 all	
with	which	 they	came	up	was	oral	 report!	Obviously	 the	progress	 is	unsatisfactory.	Members	of	various	political	
hues	 are	 still	 divided	 over	 what	 could	 be	 the	 exact	 definition	 of	 terrorism.	 In	 conclusion	 -	 the	 UN	 has	 no	
internationally-agreed	definition	of	terrorism	and	in	our	opinion,	it	will	be	a	miracle	if	we	arrive	at	any	acceptable	
global	definition	soon.	
The	situation	is	more	or	less	the	same	in	EU.	The Council of Europe Convention	on	the	Prevention of Terrorism	(CETS	
No	196),	adopted	 in	2005,	does	not	provide	a	definition	of	 terrorism,	but	does	criminalise	public	provocation	 to	
commit	a	terrorist	offence	and	recruitment	and	training	for	terrorism.	The	Additional	Protocol	to	the	Convention	
was	adopted	by	the	Committee	of	Ministers	in	May	2015	and	opened	for	signature	in	October	2015.	The	Protocol	
criminalises	being	recruited	for	terrorism,	receiving	training	for	terrorism,	travelling	to	another	state	for	purposes	
related	to	terrorism,	and	providing	or	collecting	funds	for	such	travel.	The	EU	and	twelve	Member	States	signed	the	
Protocol	on	22	October	2015.	The	same	day,	the	Presidency	of	Luxembourg	signed	the	Convention	on	behalf	of	the	
EU.	
The	European	Union	defines	terrorism	for	legal/official	purposes	in	Art.1	of	the	Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism	 (2002)6.	 This	 provides	 that	 terrorist	 offences	 are	 certain	 criminal	 offences	 set	 out	 in	 a	 list	 comprised	
largely	of	serious	offences	against	persons	and	property	which:	given	their	nature	or	context,	may	seriously	damage	
a	country	or	an	international	organization	where	committed	with	the	aim	of:	seriously	intimidating	a	population;	or	
unduly	compelling	a	Government	or	international	organization	to	perform	or	abstain	from	performing	any	act;	or	
seriously	 destabilizing	 or	 destroying	 the	 fundamental	 political,	 constitutional,	 economic	 or	 social	 structures	 of	 a	
country	or	an	international	organization.	
In	the	United States,	for	instance,	references	to	terrorism	are	made	in	numerous	context-specific	federal	statutes	
and	regulations7.	 In	the	U.S.	Code,	entitled	"Terrorism”	a	distinction	is	made	between	domestic	and	international	
terrorism.	"Domestic	terrorism" means	activities	with	the	following	three	characteristics:		
1.	Involve	acts	dangerous	to	human	life	that	violate	federal	or	state	law;	
2.	Appear	intended	(i)	to	intimidate	or	coerce	a	civilian	population;	(ii)	to	influence	the	policy	of	a	government	by	
intimidation	 or	 coercion;	 or	 (iii)	 to	 affect	 the	 conduct	 of	 a	 government	 by	 mass	 destruction,	 assassination	 or	
kidnapping;	
3.	Occur	primarily	within	the	territorial	jurisdiction	of	the	U.S.	
																																																						
3	All	of	these	documents	can	be	find	at	the	web	page	of	UN:	<http://www.un.org>	
4	Measures to eliminate international terrorism (Agenda item 108) at: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/70/int_terrorism.shtml> 
5	Oral	report	of	the	Chairman	of	the	Working	Group	on	"Measures	to	eliminate	international	terrorism,"	November	13,	2015,	UN 
General Assembly Sixth Committee	at:	<http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/site/developments/?d=13806	>	
6	See:	<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al33168>	
7	18	U.S.C.	§	2331	defines	"international	terrorism"	and	"domestic	terrorism"	for	purposes	of	Chapter	113B	of	the	U.S.	Code,	
entitled	"Terrorism.”		
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"International	terrorism"	means	activities	with	the	following	three	characteristics:	
1. Involve	violent	acts	or	acts	dangerous	to	human	life	that	violate	federal	or	state	law;	
2. Appear	 to	 be	 intended	 (i)	 to	 intimidate	 or	 coerce	 a	 civilian	 population;	 (ii)	 to	 influence	 the	 policy	 of	 a	
government	 by	 intimidation	 or	 coercion;	 or	 (iii)	 to	 affect	 the	 conduct	 of	 a	 government	 by	 mass	 destruction,	
assassination,	or	kidnapping;	and	
3. Occur	primarily	outside	the	territorial	jurisdiction	of	the	U.S.,	or	transcend	national	boundaries	in	terms	of	
the	means	by	which	they	are	accomplished,	the	persons	they	appear	intended	to	intimidate	or	coerce,	or	the	locale	
in	which	their	perpetrators	operate	or	seek	asylum.8	
The	Arab	Convention	for	the	Suppression	of	Terrorism9	was	adopted	by	the	Council	of	Arab	Ministers	of	the	Interior	
and	the	Council	of	Arab	Ministers	of	Justice	in	Cairo,	Egypt	in	1998.	Terrorism	was	defined	in	the	convention	as:		
“Any	act	or	threat	of	violence,	whatever	its	motives	or	purposes,	that	occurs	in	the	advancement	of	an	individual	or	
collective	criminal	agenda	and	seeking	to	sow	panic	among	people,	causing	fear	by	harming	them,	or	placing	their	
lives,	 liberty	 or	 security	 in	 danger,	 or	 seeking	 to	 cause	 damage	 to	 the	 environment	 or	 to	 public	 or	 private	
installations	or	property	or	to	occupying	or	seizing	them,	or	seeking	to	jeopardize	national	resources”.	
But,	 nevertheless	 terrorism	 remains	moving	 target.	 As	we	 see	 it	 is	 defined	 and	 interpreted	 in	 different	ways	 in	
different	countries	and	organizations.	Now	let’s	hear	what	philosophers	have	to	say	on	the	same	topic.	
 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The	 problem	with	 determining	 terrorism	was	 quite	 simple	 until	 the	 beginning	 of	 20-th	 century.	 Because	 as	 we	
already	mentioned	it	was	firstly	used	in	the	time	of	the	reign	of	terror	the	Jacobins	imposed	in	France	from	the	fall	
of	1793	to	the	summer	of	1794.	Actually	that	was	not	a	terrorism	related	to	the	notion	in	today’s	terms.	It	was	not	
loaded	with	today`s	meaning.		
Very	 soon	 the	 term	 terrorism	 came	 to	 be	 associated	with	 drastic	 abuse	 of	 power	 and	 related	 to	 the	 notion	 of	
tyranny	as	rule	based	on	fear,	which	meant	a	shift	toward	very	strong	negative	connotations	of	the	term.	But	even	
in	the	age	of	totalitarism,	when	the	term	was	connected	with	the	state	itself	there	was	no	such	a	problem	dealing	
with	the	terrorism	itself.	For	that	purpose,	a	term	“state	terrorism”	was	coined	to	refer	to	the	terror	of	the	state,	
i.e.	of	the	state	as	a	terrorist.	But,	as	we	said,	that	was	not	a	problem	for	internal	state	terrorism	to	continue	to	be	
practiced	by	military	dictatorships	in	many	parts	of	the	world.		
The	problem	with	terrorism	arouses	with	the	new	type	of	terrorism	that	stepped	forward	in	the	second	half	of	the	
20th	 century	 and	 especially	 in	 early	 21st	 century	 conducted	 by	 insurgent	 organizations.	 Many	 movements	 for	
national	 liberation	 from	 colonial	 rule	 resorted	 to	 it,	 either	 as	 the	 main	 method	 of	 struggle	 or	 as	 a	 tactic	
complementing	 guerrilla	 warfare.	 So	 did	 some	 separatist	 movements.	 Some	 organizations	 driven	 by	 extreme	
ideologies,	 in	 particular	 on	 the	 left,	 took	 to	 terrorism	 as	the	way	 of	 trying	 to	 destroy	 what	 they	 considered	 an	
unjust,	oppressive	economic,	social	and	political	system.	And	actually	this	new	type	of	terrorism	rise	philosophical	
and	ethical	dilemmas	(and	not	just	because	it	targets	innocents).	Actually	when	this	kind	of	terrorism	came	to	the	
fore	on	the	world	scene	it	started	to	be	charged	with	strong	pejorative	meaning;	and	on	one	side	-	no	one	wanted	
to	apply	the	term	to	their	own	actions	or	to	actions	and	campaigns	of	those	they	sympathize	with,	and	on	the	other	
side	-	insurgents	practicing	terrorism	portray	their	actions	as	struggle	for	liberation	and	seek	to	be	considered	and	
treated	as	soldiers	rather	than	terrorists	or	criminals.	
From	practical	point	of	view	terrorism	is	often	treated	as	organized	crime	with	political	purposes	and	wherein	even	
those	political	purposes	are	neglected	and	the	terrorist	are	prosecuted	and	charged	for	their	criminal	deeds	solely.	
Of	course	not	all	criminals	are	terrorists,	but	all	terrorists	are	treated	as	criminals	violating	the	criminal	law.	This	is	
far	 more	 convenient	 for	 the	 States	 and	 authorities	 in	 dealing	 with	 terrorism	 than	 to	 interfere	 in	 philosophical,	
ethical	and	 judicial	debates	on	the	nature	of	 terrorism.	After	all,	 that	 is	 the	 job	of	philosophers.10	To	simplify	we	
would	put	it	this	way:	what	is	terrorism	and	terrorists?	Are	they	terrorist	-	ergo	–	an	evil,	or	freedom	fighters?	Or	as	
																																																						
8	Source	FBI:	<	https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism>	
9	<https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/conv_arab_terrorism.en.pdf>	
10	And	they	do	that,	philosophers	and	theoreticians	take	issue	with	the	treatment	of	terrorists	as	a	criminals	or	freedom	fighters.	
See	chapter:	MICHAEL	W.	BROUHT,	PAULINE	KAURIN:	Terrorists: Enemy Combats or Criminals (205-243)	in	Timothy	Shanahan,	
ed.	(2005),	Philosophy 9/11: Thinking about the War on terrorism.	Chicago	and	La	Sale:	Open	Court.	
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one	title	of	a	paper	suggests,	“killing	civilians	or	holding	territory?”11	We	will	answer	this	question	by	trying	to	give	
some	philosophical	definitions	of	terrorism;	thereby	we	will	propose	our	own	definition.	
Trying	to	define	terrorism	one	has	to	adhere	to	three	criteria,	as	A.	Schwenkenbecher	in	his	recent	book	Terrorism: 
A Philosophical Enquiry	 suggests:	 first	 it	 has	 to	 incorporate	 the	 paradigmatic	 instances	 of	 terrorism	 (as	 9/11	 or	
similar);	second,	the	definition	should	not	incorporate	any	moral	assessment	of	the	act	in	question;	and	third	–	“the	
definition	should	single	out	a	certain	group	of	actions	enabling	us	 to	clearly	distinguish	 these	actions	 from	other	
kinds	of	actions,	that	is,	to	clearly	identify	which	acts	are	terrorist	by	their	nature	and	which	are	not”.12	We	may	say	
that	we	agree	on	second	and	third	criteria.	However	is	not	with	the	first	one.	Because,	the	other	two	conditions	are	
quite	relevant,	but	the	first	one	is	logically	inconsistent.	Namely,	how	one	can	incorporate	paradigmatic	cases	in	a	
definition	 before	 the	 definition	 is	 given?	 Determination	 of	 those	 cases,	 even	 such	 “obvious”	 one	 like	 9/11,	 as	
terrorism,	is	not	possible	before	given	definition	of	terrorism.	It	is	methodologically	and	logically	inconsistent.	It	is	
strange	how	this	author	does	not	see	this	fallacy.	Especially	when	having	in	mind	that	the	same	fallacy	is	immanent	
in	 the	 second	 assumption	 that	 definition	 should	 not	 incorporate	 any	 moral	 assessment,	 which	 author	 clearly	
recognize.	 Because	 incorporating	 such	 moral	 assumption	 in	 to	 definition	 itself	 has	 the	 same	 false	 logic	 that	 is	
applicable	 in	the	first	criteria	too.	One	should	first	define	what	terrorism	is	than	to	subject	 it	to	moral	 judgment.	
Very	important	is	the	third	criteria,	the	one	that	demands	distinction	between	other	violent	actions	and	terrorism	
itself.	 It	 contains	 the	core	of	definition	because	 it	 is	 some	kind	of	“diferentia	specifica.”	 Is	 that	kind	of	definition	
possible?			
It	is	not	an	easy	task	at	all.	Especially	if	one	thinks	in	philosophical	frames	and	thus	problematizing	everything.	First,	
if	one	is	thinking	on	an	essential	level,	there	is	a	crucial	problem	to	distinguish	a	war	from	terrorism,	for	example.	
For	that	purpose,	 lets	offer	the	first	 (we	may	say	philosophical)	definitions	of	war,	by	which	we	will	see	that	 it	 is	
quite	difficult	to	make	the	above-mentioned	distinction.	Namely,	Clausewitz	defines	war	as	a	political instrument,	
i.e.	political	goal	is	the	primary	motive	of	the	war;	hence	and	the	political	goal	of	the	war	will	be	the	measurement	
that	 determines	 the	 goal	 of	 the	military	 act.13	 He	 says:	 “war	 is	 not	merely	 a	 political	 act,	 but	 genuine	 political	
instrument,	extension	of	the	political	relationships	-	its	continuation	with	different	means.”14		
So	 the	 terrorism	 is.	 Money,	 wealth	 or	 a	 mere	 crime	 has	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 terrorism.	 Some	 violent	 act	 to	 be	
defined	 as	 terrorism	 it	 has	 to	 have	 political	 motivation.	 So	 from	 that	 point	 of	 view	 (that	 seems	 essential	 for	
terrorism	though),	it	cannot	be	distinguished	from	war.	In	order	to	do	that	we	may	add	that	terrorism	specifically	
targets	in	its	violence	people	who	are	not	strictly	political	entities	who	has	some	fault	–	in	most	cases	victims	are	
not	policy	makers.	Well,	that	sounds	like	sufficient	differentiation	from	war.	But,	is	it?	If	we	think	for	a	moment	of	a	
WWII	and	the	awful	Allied	bombings	of	Dresden,	or	even	worst	case	–	nuclear	bombing	of	Hiroshima	and	Nagasaki	-	
In	both	cases	a	civilians	were	involved	who	were	not	policy	makers	and	has	not	any	fault.		
Hence	most	people	strongly	condemn	terrorism,	strongly	than	they	would	condemn	war;	yet	they	often	fail	to	say	
how	terrorist	acts	differ	from	other	acts	of	violence	such	as	the	killing	of	civilians	 in	war.	Exactly	on	this	bases	of	
inability	 for	 distinction,	 above-mentioned	 Schwenkenbacher	 thinks	 that	 lies	 the	 danger	 terrorism	 to	 be	morally	
justified	-	 if	one	does	not	give	a	proper	definition	 it	won’t	be	possible	to	condemn	it.	The	author	argues	that	we	
cannot	 have	morally	 credible	 views	 about	 terrorism	 if	 we	 focus	 on	 terrorism	 alone	 and	 neglect	 broader	 issues	
about	 the	 war.	 Assuming	 that	 terrorism	 is	 just	 one	 of	 many	 kinds	 of	 political	 violence,	 he	 denies	 that	 it	 is	
necessarily	wrong	and	worse	than	war.	If	terrorism	is	just	one	of	many	forms	of	political	violence	than	“terrorism	is	
not	necessarily	morally	wrong	and	not	morally	worse	than	war	and	if	war	can	be	justified	than	so	can	terrorism.”15	
Having	 in	mind	this,	one	may	say	 that	 there	 is	no	difference	between	war	and	terrorism:	and	thus	 if	war	can	be	
justified	 terrorism	can	be	 too.	That`s	why	 is	 crucial	 for	us	 to	 find	 the	difference	between	war	and	 terrorism	and	
other	forms	of	violence	respectfully.		
Than	 what	 is	 the	 difference	 between	 terrorism	 and	 war?	 And	 where	 it	 can	 be	 located?	 Let’s	 try	 to	 depict	 the	
scenery	were	both	acts	occur	in	order	to	find	that	distinction.	And	aftermath	we	will	try	to	give	few	philosophical	
definitions	of	 terrorism	by	which	 that	distinctions	will	 came	to	 the	 fore.	As	we	can	see	war	 is	a	 form	of	political	
																																																						
11	V.	Asal,	L.	De	La	Calle,		M.Findley,	and	J.Young,	“Killing	Civilians	or	Holding	Territory?	How	to	Think	about	Terrorism,”	
International Studies Review,	14,	2012,	475–497 
12	Anne	Schwenkenbacher	,	Terrorism: A Philosophical Enquiry.	London:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2012,	7-8		
13	Karl	Von	Klauzevic	,O Ratu.	Beograd:	Vojno	delo,	1951,	44-45	
14	Ibid.,	113	
15	Anne	Schwenkenbacher	,Terrorism: A Philosophical Enquiry.	London:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2012,	151	
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communication.	Terrorism	is	also	a	mean	of	political	communication.	We	can	agree	that	both	are	political	means.	
But	unlike	war	that	takes	place	in	some	internationally	defined	scene	and	norms,	terrorism	takes	place	in	shadows,	
out	of	all	established	and	recognized	norms.	So,	from	philosophical	perspective	we	can	set	the	distinction	between	
war	and	terrorism	on	ethical	ground.	Why	is	that?	What	that	does	it	mean	in	a	first	place?	That	means	that	even	a	
war	is	grounded	and	waged	in	some	ethical	settings,	i.e.	there	is	ethics	of	war!	There	is	no	ethics	of	terrorism	in	a	
meaning	that	there	are	some	standards	according	to	which	terrorism	can	be	waged.	While	we	can	say	that	there	a	
certain	rules	and	regulations	even	in	war,	we	cannot	say	the	same	about	terrorism.	Namely	terrorism	is	terrorism	
just	because	 it`s	out	of	all	 rules.	Nevertheless,	who	 is	defining	 those	 rules	of	war	 (imperialistic	 countries	or	not)	
there	are	rules	of	waging	war,	there	are	not	rules	of	waging	terrorism.	And	killing	innocent	civilians	is	not	in	one	of	
those	 rules.	 Killing	 innocents	 in	 war	 is	 forbidden,	 considered	 as	 breaking	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 war	 and	 it	 would	 be	
condemned	by	all	on	the	bases	of	those	rules.			
After	depicting	the	scene,	we	may	continue	in	our	quest	for	proper	definition	of	terrorism.	Thus	Donald	Black	in	his	
well-known	paper	on	terrorism	(building	on	definitions	of	Seneckal	de	la	Roche,	and	Ganor),	says	that	“terrorism	in	
its	purest	form	is	self-help	by	organized	civilians	who	covertly	 inflict	mass	violence	on	other	civilians.”16	This	Max	
Weberian	“ideal-type”	definition	includes	civilians	as	a	perpetrators	and	victims	of	terrorism	which	is	in	the	core	of	
terrorism.	 But	 it	 lacks	 some	 other	 essential	 elements	 of	 it.	 Like	 political	 goals	 implied	 in	 it	 for	 example,	 and	
especially	its	connection	with	innocent	victims.	That	is	why	we	are	going	to	see	some	other	definitions	offered	by	
philosophers.	
Swedish	 philosopher	 and	 a	 professor	 of	 practical	 philosophy	 at	 the	University	 of	 Kalmar,	 Per	 Bauhn	 in	 his	 book	
Ethical Aspects of Political Terrorism	gives	such	definition:	“The	performance	of	violent	acts,	directed	against	one	or	
more	persons,	 intended	by	 the	performing	agent	 to	 intimidate	one	or	more	persons	and	 thereby	 to	bring	about	
one	 or	more	 of	 the	 agent`s	 political	 goals.”17	 As	 we	 can	 see	 there	 a	 several	 constitutive	 elements	 of	 terrorism	
important	for	this	author:	1.	violent	act;	2.	 intimidation;	3.	political	goals.	This	 is	so	called	“broad”	definition	(we	
will	 discuss	 this	 later)	 that	 does	 not	 take	 in	 to	 consideration	 non-combatants,	 i.e.	 civilians	 as	 a	 core	 trait	 of	
terrorism.	But	as	we	already	mentioned	this	kind	of	definitions	are	too	broad	and	thus	contains	risk	of	confusing	
terrorism	with	war	or	other	forms	of	violence.	To	illustrate	this	just	put	word	“assassination”	as	a	definition	subject	
instead	of	 “terrorism”	and	 it	will	work	perfectly	 fine	 too:	 “Assassination	 is	 performance	of	 violent	 acts,	 directed	
against	one	or	more	persons…	etc.”		
On	the	other	side,	Primoratz	Igor,	for	example	offers	so	called	“narrow”	definition	that	includes	innocent	as	a	core	
element	 of	 terrorism,	 but	 his	 definition	 lacks	 the	 required	 political	 dimension.	 Thus,	 he	 manages	 to	 avoid	 the	
danger	of	confusing	terrorism	with	some	other	form	of	violence,	but	fail	to	avoid	some	other	confusion	because	of	
which	 this	definition	still	has	an	essential	deficiency.	He	defines	 terrorism	as:	 “The	deliberate	use	of	violence,	or	
threat	of	its	use,	against	innocent	people,	with	the	aim	of	intimidating	some	other	people	into	a	course	of	action	
they	otherwise	would	 not	 take.”18	 This	 is	 quite	 elegant	 definition	 including	 one	of	 the	 core	 traits	 of	 terrorism	–	
innocent.	But	because	it	lacks	political	dimension	still	can	be	misinterpreted.	What	if	one	simply	makes	just	a	tiny	
replacement	in	the	defining	term	“terrorism”	with	term	“kidnappers”	for	example?	Kidnappers	are	using	violence,	
against	innocent	people	with	the	aim	of	intimidating	some	people	in	order	to	force	them	to	take	a	course	of	action	
they	 otherwise	 they	 would	 not	 take?	 This,	 maybe	 exaggerated	 illustration,	 is	 in	 order	 to	 illustrate	 that	 lack	 of	
political	dimension	of	terrorism	may	led	to	its	misinterpretation.	Terrorism	is	political	act	par	excellence	and	every	
definition	has	to	take	it	into	consideration.		
In	Corlett`s	book	-	Terrorism: A Philosophical Analysis the	following	definition	is	given:	“Terrorism	is	the	attempt	to	
achieve	(or	prevent)	political,	social,	economic	or	religious	change	by	actual	or	threatened	use	of	violence	against	
other	persons	or	other	person`s	property;	the	violence	(or	threat	thereof),	employed	 in	terrorism	is	aimed	partly	
destabilizing	 the	 existing	 political	 or	 social	 order,	 but	mainly	 at	 publicizing	 the	 goals	 or	 cause	 espoused	 by	 the	
terrorists	or	by	those	or	by	those	on	whose	behalf	the	terrorist	act;	often	though	not	always	terrorism	is	aimed	at	
provoking	 extreme	 counter-measures	 which	 will	 win	 public	 support	 for	 the	 terrorist	 and	 their	 cause.”19	 This	 is	
almost	complete	but	in	our	opinion	rather	complex	and	even	clumsy	definition	with	abundance	of	elements.	
																																																						
16	Donald	Black,	The Geometry of terrorism.	Sociological	Theory,	22/1,	2004,	14-25	
17	Kalmar	Per	Bauhn,	Ethical Aspects of Political Terrorism.	Lund:	Lund	University	Press,1989,	28	
18	Igor	Primoratz,	Terrorism: A philosophical Investigation,	Cambridge:	Polity	Press,2013,	34	
19	J.	Angelo	Corlett,	Terrorism: A Philosophical Analysis.	London:	Kluwer	Academic	Publisher,	2003,	167	
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These	several	offered	definitions	among	other	goals	had	one	 in	particular	–	to	show	two	different	approaches	 in	
defining	terrorism.	One	narrow,	second	one	is	broad.	Narrow	definitions	restrict	terrorist	violence	to	that	directed	
strictly	at	innocent	persons.	They	consider	that	terrorism	is	attack	on	innocent	–	and	that	is	a	core	feature	of	this	
violent	act.	Those	who	oppose	this	suggest	that	broader	definition	is	more	appropriate.	Broad	definition	that	does	
not	make	 restriction	 and	 they	 include	 combatants	 as	well	 as	 non-combatants	 in	 their	 definition.	 They	 object	 to	
define	terrorism	as	violence	against	innocent	persons	only.	They	argue	that	doing	so	runs	together	the	question	of	
the	nature	of	 terrorism	and	 that	 of	 it	moral	 status	 and	begs	 the	moral	 issue	by	making	 terrorism	unjustified	by	
definition.	What	is	needed	is	morally	neutral	definition,	as	above	mention	author	Schwenkenbecher	insisted	as	one	
of	 three	 criteria	 that	 have	 to	 be	met	 in	 definition.	 The	 criteria	 that	 a	 definition	 has	 to	meet	 are	 to	 be	morally	
neutral,	and	that	means	that	a	narrow	one	cannot	be	taken	into	consideration,	but	rather	a	wide	one.		
But	 it	 is	 virtually	 impossible	 to	 offer	 morally	 untainted	 definition.	We	 think	 that	 even	 broad	 type	 of	 definition	
cannot	be	morally	 indifferent	 definition	 since	 incorporates	 such	 terms	 that	 are	moral	 terms	par	 excellence.	 Like	
term	 violence	 for	 instance!	 Violence	 is	 not	 merely	 a	 psychological	 or	 sociological	 term	 it	 is	 an	 ethical	 term,	
subjected	to	moral	investigation.	Broad	definition	that	takes	violence,	as	one	of	the	core	traits	of	terrorism	has	to	
have	in	mind	that	violence	itself	is	morally	loaded.	Well,	is	this	meant	that	morally	neutral	definition	is	impossible	
nevertheless	it	is	required?	As	we	agreed	with	a	criteria	mentioned	by	Schwenkenbecher,	that	every	definition	has	
to	meet	 if	 we	want	 it	 to	 be	 credible:	 the	 definition	 should	 not	 incorporate	 any	moral	 assessment	 of	 the	 act	 in	
question.	On	one	side	that	means	that	narrow	definition	including	innocent	is	impossible	as	it	 is	morally	charged,	
on	 the	other	 side	we	 saw	 that	 even	broad	definition	 contains	morally	 charged	 terms	 as	well.	 Is	 this	meant	 that	
morally	neutral	definition	is	impossible?	We	think	it	is	possible!	We	think	that	narrow	definition	that	contains	term	
non-combatants	 instead	of	 innocent	 is	 suitable	definition.	Non-combatants	or	 civilians	are	morally	neutral	 term!	
We	agree	that	innocent	or	guilty	are	terms	requiring	moral	assessment	and	thus	in	the	sphere	of	morality,	but	not	
the	term	civilians	or	non-combatants.	Civilian	or	non-combatants	are	simply	out	of	the	scope	of	ethics	as	science.		
Being	a	civilian	has	nothing	to	do	with	ethics	as	science	and	moral	judgment	it	is	just	a	simple	state	of	existing	in	a	
social	community.	One	can	be	just	a	civilian	nevertheless	if	he	is	innocent	or	not.	So,	just	a	simple	replacement	of	
the	term	innocent	with	civilians	will	solve	the	problem.		
Having	all	of	this	in	mind	at	the	end	of	this	chapter	we	will	offer	a	definition	that	we	consider	most	complete	and	
comprehensive	and	on	basses	of	which	a	correct	moral	assessment	can	be	made.	We	may	say	that	terrorist	act	is	a	
sudden,	unannounced	and	violent	political	act	intentionally	targeting	non-combatants/civilians	or	their	property,	to	
draw	public	attention	for	the	cause,	in	order	to	reach	political	objectives.	This	definition	is	broad	enough	by	its	form	
(to	include	all	necessary	facets	of	terrorism),	but	narrow	in	its	contents	by	including	civilians.	Threat	as	a	trait	that	is	
often	included	into	other	definitions,	here	is	excluded	for	an	obvious	reason	–	it	is	just	that	–	a	threat	and	can	and	
should	be	defined	otherwise.	They	are	considered	as	a	threat	namely	just	because	of	the	act	–	use	of	violence,	so	
the	 essential	 is	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 rather	 than	 a	 threat	 of	 violence.	 They	 are	 threats	 in	 relation	 with	 the	 act,	
otherwise	they	would	not	be	considered	as	such	in	a	first	place.	So	the	act	is	primary	object	of	definition.		
Further,	the	moment	of	surprise	and	the	fact	that	no	terrorists	announce	their	act	is	distinctive	trait	from	war.	One	
might	 object	 that	 the	 war	 is	 clearly	 distinct	 from	 terrorism	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 war	 a	 nations	 are	 engaged,	 in	
terrorism	aren’t.	We	agree	that	it	is	clear	demarcation	line	between	war	and	terrorism.	Full	definition	of	war	in	the	
Merriam-Webster	 Dictionary	 is	 “a	 state	 of	 usually	 open	 and	 declared	 armed	 hostile	 conflict	 between	 states	 or	
nations”.20	On	2-th	of	april	1917,	for	 instance,	President	Woodrow	Wilson	asks	Congress	to	send	U.S.	troops	 into	
battle	against	Germany	in	World	War	I.	War	is	declared	terrorism	isn’t,	and	we	consider	that	should	be	underline,	
nevertheless	 that	war	 is	 often	defined	as	 a	 conflict	 state	between	nations.	 If	we	have	 in	mind	 the	philosophical	
approach	to	war	and	the	first	given	definition	of	war	by	Clausewitz,	this	distinction	is	very	important.	Moment	of	
surprise	 and	 unexpected	 attack	 is	 what	 terrorism	 makes	 efficient	 fighting	 tool	 for	 political	 goals.	 In	 addition,	
intentionally	 targeting	 the	 non-combatants	 is	 another	 distinctive	 trait	 of	 terrorism.	 No	 war	 intends	 to	 target	
civilians.	It	is	a	conflict	between	armies	and	targeting	civilians	is	subjected	to	condemnation	as	a	breaking	the	rules	
of	warfare.	Not	because	we	presuppose	that	civilians	are	innocent	(that	has	to	be	discussed	yet	if	needed),	but	just	
because	 they	are	not	 involved	 in	 the	 conflict	 and	by	attacking	 them	attacker	 is	 simply	 violating	 the	 rules	of	war	
nevertheless	is	it	moral	or	not.	It	is	just	a	violation	of	rules,	not	norms	in	ethical	sense	of	the	term.	War	is	unjust	in	
its	essence	but	when	happens	there	are	strict	rules	that	involved	parties	has	to	obey.	
 
																																																						
20	Online	Merriam-Webster	Dictionary	<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/war>	
IJSSIS  VOLUME: 2, NUMBER: 1 
	
11	
	
ETHICAL APROACH 
Ethics	or	moral	 philosophy	 is	 a	 branch	 of	 philosophy	 that	 involves	 systematizing,	 defending,	 and	 recommending	
concepts	of	right	and	wrong	conduct.	Ethics	try	to	give	answers	to	moral	issues,	it	investigates	the	questions	"What	
is	the	best	way	for	people	to	live?"	and	"What	actions	are	right	or	wrong	in	particular	circumstances?"	In	practice,	
ethics	seeks	to	resolve	questions	of	human	morality,	by	defining	concepts	such	as	good	and	evil,	right	and	wrong,	
virtue	and	vice,	justice	and	crime.	All	of	these	issues	are	relevant	tools	for	examination	of	terrorism.	When	talking	
about	ethical	issues	on	terrorism	actually	we	are	talking	about	two	specific	approaches	in	ethics	that	can	be	applied	
on	 terrorism.	We	may	 say	 that	 two	main	approaches	 toward	various	ethical	questions	are	distillates	 throughout	
history	 –	 consequentialism, and	 nonconsequentialism.	 These	 approaches	 can	 be	 used	 as	 an	 explanation	 toward	
terrorism	too.	In	ethics	in	generally	these	two	main	approaches:	consequentialism	and	nonconsequentialism.	Let’s	
explain	briefly	what	are	they	about.	
Consequentialism	is	a	set	of	normative	ethical	theories	holding	that	consequences	of	one`s	conduct	is	the	ultimate	
basis	 for	 judgment	 about	 the	 rightness	 or	 wrongness	 of	 that	 conduct.	 Thus,	 from	 a	 point	 of	 view	 of	
consequentialism	a	morally	right	or	wrong	act	is	judged	by	the	consequences,	i.e.	right	is	act	that	produces	a	good	
outcome	and	wrong	is	the	one	that	produce	bad	outcome	or	consequence.	Consequentialism	claims	that	the	right	
act	or	system	of	rules	is	the	one	that	maximizes	the	balance	of	good	consequences	over	bad	ones.	If	consequences	
are	good,	rather	than	bad,	than	the	act	can	be	morally	justified.		
Nonconsequentialism is	 a	 type	 of	 normative	 ethical	 theory	 that	 denies	 that	 the	 rightness	 or	 wrongness	 of	 our	
conduct	is	determined	solely	by	the	goodness	or	badness	of	the	consequences	of	our	acts	or	of	the	rules	to	which	
those	acts	 conform.	Non-consequentialist	ethics	holds	 that	actions	are	 intrinsically	 good	or	bad	 (by	 themselves),	
their	rightness/wrongness	does	not	depend	on	their	consequences.	Nonconsequentialism	assumes	that	some	kind	
of	action	is	good	based	on	its	inherent	value	as	good,	and	that	some	kinds	of	action	(such	as	breaking	promises	or	
killing	the	innocent)	are	wrong	in	themselves,	and	not	just	wrong	because	they	have	bad	consequences.	
 
CONCLUSION: CAN TERRORISM BE MORALLY JUSTIFIED 
In	conclusion	we	will	consider	the	moral	 issue	–	can	terrorism	be	morally	 justified	from	the	stand	point	of	above	
mentioned	two	main	approaches	in	ethics:	consequentialism	and	nonconsequentialism.	So,	let’s	look	at	terrorism	
from	these	two	general	ethical	approaches.		
Adherents	of	consequentialism	 judge	 terrorism	 solely	by	 its	 consequences.	 Terrorism	 is	not	 considered	wrong	 in	
itself,	but	only	if	it	has	bad	consequences	on	balance.	Thereby	the	innocence	of	the	victims	does	not	change	that.	
As	 we	 can	 see	 he	 uses	 wide	 definition	 approach	 in	 which	 the	 innocence	 of	 victims	 makes	 no	 difference	 to	 its	
justification.	Kai	Nielsen	approaches	terrorism	as	a	consequentialist	in	ethics.	He	thinks	that	though	acts	of	violence	
are	 at	 least	 prima	 facie	wrong,	 circumstances	 can	 arise	where,	 even	 in	 democracies,	 some	 of	 them	 are	morally	
justified21	 In	his	paper	“On justifying violence”	he	discusses	 the	question	“whether	 revolutionary	violence	 is	ever	
justified	as	a	means	of	establishing	or	promoting	human	freedom	and	happiness.”	And	in	this	paper	he	“states	the	
conditions	which	must	be	satisfied	for	such	violence	to	be	justified	and	argue	that	sometimes	these	conditions	have	
been	satisfied.”	So,	he	presupposes	that	there	are	such	acceptable	conditions	by	which	terrorism	can	be	justified.	
“Terrorist	acts	must	be	justified	by	their	political	effects	and	their	moral	consequences.	They	are	justified	(1)	when	
they	are	politically	effective	weapons	in	the	revolutionary	struggle	and	(2)	when,	everything	considered,	there	are	
sound	reasons	for	believing	that,	by	the	use	of	 that	type	of	violence	rather	than	no	violence	at	all	or	violence	of	
some	other	 type,	 there	will	 be	 less	 injustice,	 suffering	and	degradation	 in	 the	world	 than	would	otherwise	have	
been	the	case”22	
As	we	 can	 see	 for	 consequentialism	 there	 are	 certain	 circumstances	when	 terrorism	 can	 be	 justified.	 He	 draws	
some	historically	significant	events	as	an	example	where	terrorism	was	used	as	a	method	of	struggle	 in	order	 to	
overthrow	bad	governments	or	struggle	against	injustice.		
What	can	be	the	main	objection	to	this	argument	of	Nielsen	argument?	On	first	look	it	seems	that	this	argument	is	
strong.	 Especially	 because	 it	 can	 justify	 terrorism	 widely	 defined	 where	 innocents	 are	 involved.	 But	 the	 main	
objection	 to	 this	 kind	 of	 argument	 actually	 can	 be	 the	 same	 common	 objection	 that	 can	 be	 made	 to	 any	
consequentialistic	 ethics.	 These	 objections	 can	 be	 summarized	 under	 well	 known	 saying,	 “the	 end	 justifies	 the	
																																																						
21	Kai	Nielsen,	On Justifying Violence.	Inquiry	24	(1),	1981,	21	–	5	
22	Kai	Nielsen,“Violence	and	Terrorism:	Its	Uses	and	Abuses”,	pp.446	in	Burton	M.	Leiser	(ed.),	Values in Conflict,	New	York:	
Macmillan,	1981,	435–449	
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means”,	which	 of	 course	 can`t	 be	 justified.	No	 one	 can	 be	 sure	 that	 the	 goal	 is	morally	 important	 enough;	 any	
method	of	achieving	 it	 is	acceptable.	Namely,	how	great	has	to	be	a	good,	 to	be	good	enough	to	 justify	using	of	
terror	 and	 violence?	 Second,	 who	 can	 define	 greater	 good,	 who	 has	 a	mandate	 to	 do	 that?	 Even	 if	 these	 two	
conditions	are	acceptable	third	questions	is	not:	how	one	can	guarantee	that	at	the	and	the	good	will	be	achieved	
by	 the	means	 of	 terrorism?	At	 the	 end	how	one	 can	 claim	 that	 the	 same	 goal	 can	 be	 reached	by	morally	 good	
means	instead	of	bad?	Consequentialism	can`t	address	these	objections	and	thus	those	trying	to	justify	terrorism	
on	this	basis	fail	to	discharge	this	burden	too.			
Now	let’s	look	at	the	arguments	of	nonconsequentialism.	As	far	as	nonconsequentialism	is	concerned	it	seems	that	
things	here	are	clearer	than	in	case	of	consequentialism.	If	for	nonconsequentialism	human	acts	are	judged	solely	
on	 its	 intrinsic	 value	 it	 is	 more	 than	 obvious	 that	 killing	 is	 bad,	 killing	 innocent	 especially.	 Within	 a	
nonconsequentialist	approach	to	morality,	terrorism	is	considered	wrong	in	itself,	because	of	what	it	is,	rather	than	
only	because	its	consequences	are	bad	on	balance.	This	kinds	of	action	-	such	as	killing	the	innocent	-	are	wrong	in	
themselves,	and	not	just	wrong	because	they	have	bad	consequences.	And	this	seems	that	is	sufficient	argument	
for	not	justifying	terrorism.	But	this	is	not	to	say	that	this	approach	leaves	no	room	whatever	for	morally	justifying	
certain	acts	or	campaigns	of	terrorism.	Indeed,	nonconsequentialist	discussions	of	terrorism	also	present	a	range	of	
positions	and	arguments.	Some	authors	are	trying	to	justify	it	exactly	on	the	bases	of	noncosequentialism.	How	is	
that	possible	and	in	what	cases?		
One	line	of	argumentation	goes	by	invoking	some	deontological	considerations	such	as	justice	or	rights.	When	right	
or	rights	of	a	persons	are	not	respected,	what	may	be	done	to	ensure	that	they	will	be?	If	some	basic	human	rights	
are	not	respected,	claim	these	adherents,	resorting	to	terrorism	can	be	justified.	Terrorism	obviously	violates	some	
human	rights	of	its	victims.	But	its	advocates	claim	that	in	some	circumstances	a	limited	use	of	terrorism	is	the	only	
way	of	bringing	about	a	society	where	human	rights	of	all	will	be	respected.	But	this	line	of	argumentation	barely	
can	satisfy	the	basic	elements	of	deontological	 logic.	Namely	if	one`s	acts	are	judged	solely	by	the	moral	essence	
inherent	into	the	value,	then	one	value	is	higher	than	other.	Deontologist	admits	that	there	is	hierarchy	of	values.	
Thus,	how	any	right	can	be	higher	than	life?		
In	such	circumstances	when	basic	human	rights	are	violated,	terrorism	can	be	permissible	only	in	a	narrow	range	of	
cases.	Namely	 in	 the	 cases	 that	 immediate	 life	 thread	or	 total	disaster	 is	 approaching.	 This	 is	 the	 second	 line	of	
argumentation	offered	by	Michael	Walzer.	He	sets	his	argumentation	in	broader	scenery	considering	any	conflict,	
including	war.	 He	 defence	 the	 attacks	 on	 civilians	 in	 'supreme emergency'	 circumstances.	 The	 argumentation	 of	
Walzer	is	on	historical	examples,	as	it	follows:	In	early	1942,	it	seemed	that	Britain	would	be	defeated	by	Germany	
and	 that	 its	 military	 could	 not	 prevail	 while	 fighting	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 rules	 of	 war.	 Britain	 was	 the	 only	
remaining	obstacle	to	the	subjugation	of	most	of	Europe	by	the	Nazis.	Thus,	Walzer	claims:	“that	was	an	ultimate	
threat	to	everything	decent	in	our	lives,	an	ideology	and	a	practice	of	domination	so	murderous,	so	degrading	even	
to	 those	 who	 might	 survive,	 that	 the	 consequences	 of	 its	 final	 victory	 were	 literally	 beyond	 calculation,	
immeasurably	 awful.”23		Thus	 Britain	 was	 facing	 a	 “supreme	 emergency”	 imminent	 threat	 of	 something	 utterly	
unthinkable	from	a	moral	point	of	view.	In	conclusion	terrorism	can	be	justified	in	the	light	of	supreme	emergency	
and	moral	disaster.	
This	argument	of	Walzer	seems	irrefutable.	But	we	claim	that	this	is	merely	an	argument	for	resorting	to	terrorism,	
but	 rather	 an	 ideological	 position	 that	 the	 only	 thing	 that	 can	 justify	 is	 imperial	 wars.	 This	 is	 the	 exact	
“argumentation”	that	supports	so-called	“just	wars”	of	Western	countries	and	their	interventions	worldwide.	Just	
wars,	 humanitarian	 interventions,	 justifiable	 democratizations	 ….	 all	 of	 these	 rests	 in	 this	 theory.	 Resorting	 to	
terrorism	in	order	to	avoid	supreme	emergency	or	moral	disaster	is	not	moral	or	amoral;	it	is	immoral	just	because	
this	statement	is	logically	wrong.	This	is	simply	wrong	just	because	no	terrorism	can	prevent	supreme	emergency!	
Terrorist	 are	 small	 groups	 that	 can`t	 resist	 such	 approaching	 disaster.	 Could	 have	 terrorist	 stopped	 approaching	
emergency	in	a	WWII?	Could	have	been	that	kind	of	disaster	stopped	by	terrorism?			
To	conclude:	none	of	the	offered	theories	cannot	offer	valuable	and	plausible	argument	in	justification	of	terrorism,	
so	terrorism	cannot	be	justified	in	any	sense	and	under	any	circumstances.			
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